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In Bayesian statistics probability distributions express beliefs. However, for many problems the
beliefs cannot be computed analytically and approximations of beliefs are needed. We seek a loss
function that quantifies how “embarrassing” it is to communicate a given approximation. We repro-
duce and discuss an old proof showing that there is only one ranking under the requirements that
(1) the best ranked approximation is the non-approximated belief and (2) that the ranking judges
approximations only by their predictions for actual outcomes. The loss function that is obtained in
the derivation is equal to the Kullback-Leibler divergence when normalized. This loss function is
frequently used in the literature. However, there seems to be confusion about the correct order in
which its functional arguments—the approximated and non-approximated beliefs—should be used.
The correct order ensures that the recipient of a communication is only deprived of the minimal
amount of information. We hope that the elementary derivation settles the apparent confusion.
For example when approximating beliefs with Gaussian distributions the optimal approximation is
given by moment matching. This is in contrast to many suggested computational schemes.
Keywords: information theory, Bayesian inference, loss function, axiomatic derivation, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bayesian statistics, probabilities are interpreted
as degrees of belief. For any set of mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive events, one expresses the state of
knowledge as a probability distribution over that set.
The probability of an event then describes the per-
sonal confidence that this event will happen or has
happened. As a consequence, probabilities are sub-
jective properties reflecting the amount of knowledge
an observer has about the events; a different observer
might know which event happened and assign differ-
ent probabilities. If an observer gains information, she
updates the probabilities she had assigned before.
If the set of possible mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive events is infinite, it is generally impossible to
store all entries of the corresponding probability dis-
tribution on a computer or communicate it through a
channel with finite bandwidth. One therefore needs
to approximate the probability distribution which de-
scribes one’s belief. Given a limited set X of approx-
imative beliefs q(s) on a quantity s, what is the best
belief to approximate the actual belief as expressed by
the probability p(s)?
In the literature, it is sometimes claimed that the
best approximation is given by the q ∈ X that min-
imizes the Kullback–Leibler divergence (“approxima-
tion” KL) [1]
KL(p, q) =
∑
s
p(s) ln
(
p(s)
q(s)
)
(1)
where q is the approximation and p is the real belief.
We refer to this functional as “approximation” KL to
emphasize its role in approximation, which will be de-
rived in the course of this paper and to distinguish
it from the same functional, with q being a prior be-
lief and p being the posterior belief to which this KL
is minimized in inference. We will refer to the func-
tional with q being the input and p obtained through
minimization as “inference KL”. In Equation (1), min-
imization is done with respect to its second argument.
The derivation of this particular functional form varies
from field to field.
For example, in coding theory, one tries to mini-
mize the amount of bandwidth needed to transmit a
message. Given a prior q over the symbols that the
message consists of, an optimal scheme can be derived.
The approximation KL gives the expected amount of
extra bits needed to transmit such a message if the
symbols are actually drawn from the probability dis-
tribution p instead of q [2]. If we know that p is the
real probability distribution, the best approximative
probability distribution q ∈ X to base a coding on is
therefore the one minimizing the approximation KL.
However, it is not clear that minimizing the amount
of bits transferred is the best or even only measure
expressing how good such an approximation is in gen-
eral.
In machine learning and deep learning, neural net-
works are trained to understand abstract data d; for
example, to assign a label s to it. This task can be
viewed as fitting an approximative probability distri-
bution q(s|d) to a true generating probability distri-
bution p(s|d). For this, the approximative probabil-
ity distribution is parametrized (to a neural network)
and then matched to the true, generating probability
distribution using a loss function and samples. The
most frequently used loss function is the cross entropy,
which is equivalent to the approximation KL. The rea-
son to use this form is often either inspired from cod-
ing theory, or by experimental experience [3].
Another argument for minimizing the approxima-
tion KL is given in Chapter 13 of Reference [4], where
it is claimed that this yields the maximum likelihood
estimation to p(s) among the probability distribu-
tions in X and that it gives an unbiased and unique
approximation. Interchanging the arguments of the
Kullback–Leibler divergence (the inference KL used
in variational Bayes) generally leads to a biased esti-
mate and does not necessarily yield a unique result.
These arguments undoubtedly give evidence for why
minimizing the approximation KL gives a good esti-
mate. However, this does not exclude all other meth-
ods. Having an unbiased estimate refers to getting
the right mean. In our picture, this is a result of
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2optimal approximation and not a requirement for op-
timality. Additionally, this result was derived with
the help of information geometry, whose applicabil-
ity to non-local problems is criticized, for example, in
References [5, 6].
Contrary to the evidence for minimizing the approx-
imation KL, we find many examples where an approx-
imation is made by minimizing other functionals; for
example, minimizing the inference KL (e.g., [7–13]).
For many but not all of them, this is because mini-
mizing the approximation KL is not feasible in prac-
tice in their case due to the real distribution p not
being accessible.
In this paper, we seek to bring together the differ-
ent motivations and give a full and consistent picture.
The proof we present here is not new; it goes back to
[14], where there is an exact mathematical derivation
for probability densities analogously to our derivation.
However, there are earlier publications dealing with
the discrete case [15–17]. Although this proof dates
back at least 40 years, its implication on approximat-
ing beliefs seem to be quite unknown—especially in
the community of physicists applying Bayesian meth-
ods. In this paper, we reproduce a slightly modified
version of this proof, give the result a new interpreta-
tion and add further justification for the prerequisites
used, laying emphasis on why one has to accept the ax-
ioms necessary for the derivation if one is a Bayesian.
We provide argumentation for why believe approxi-
mation is an important and omnipresent topic.
We lay the emphasis of this paper more on inter-
pretation of results and justification of prerequisites,
and thus present an easy version of the proof where
the loss function is assumed to be differentiable. The
proof can however be extended to the general case of
non-differentiable loss [18]. The argument we repro-
duce gives evidence that minimizing the approxima-
tion KL is the best approximation in theory. This
argument does not rest on information geometry nor
is it restricted to coding theory. By imposing two con-
sistency requirements, one is able to exclude all rank-
ing functions with the exception of one for ranking
the approximative probability distributions q ∈ X.
For this, one employs the principle of loss functions
[19], also called cost functions, regret functions, (or
with flipped sign, utility functions or score functions)
and shows that the unique loss function for ranking
approximated probability distributions is the approx-
imation KL. For us, a ranking is a total order in-
dicating preference, whereas a loss is a map to R,
which induces a ranking but additionally gives an ab-
solute scale to compare preferences. The presented
axiomatic derivation does not give rise to any new
method, but it enables a simple checking for whether a
certain approximation is most optimally done through
the approximation KL. There are many other exam-
ples of axiomatic derivations seeking to support infor-
mation theory on a fundamental level. Some notable
examples are Cox derivation [20] of Bayesian proba-
bility theory as a unique extension of Boolean algebra
as well as a scientific discussion on the maximum en-
tropy principle [21–23], establishing the inference KL
as unique inference tool (which gave rise to the naming
convention in this paper). Most of these arguments
rely on page-long proofs to arrive at the Kullback–
Leibler divergence. The proof that is sketched in this
paper is only a few lines long, but nonetheless stan-
dard literature for axiomatic derivation in Bayesian-
ism does not cite this “easy” derivation (e.g., the influ-
ential Reference [21]). As already discussed, approx-
imation is an important and unavoidable part of in-
formation theory, and with the axiomatic derivation
presented here we seek to provide orientation to sci-
entists searching for a way to approximate probabil-
ity distributions.
In Section II, we introduce the concept of loss func-
tions, which is used in Section III to define an op-
timal scheme for approximating probability distribu-
tions that express beliefs. We briefly discuss the rel-
evance of our derivations for the scientific community
in Section IV. We conclude in Section V.
II. LOSS FUNCTIONS
The idea to evaluate predictions based on loss func-
tions dates back 70 years, and was first introduced by
Brier [24]. We explain loss functions by the means of
parameter estimation. Imagine that one would like to
give an estimate of a parameter s that is not known,
which value of s should be taken as an estimate? One
way to answer this question is by using loss functions.
For this note that p(s) is now formally a probability
measure, however we choose to write
´
dsp(s) instead
of
´
dp(s) as if p(s) would be a probability density. A
loss function in the setting of parameter estimation is
a function that takes an estimate σ for s and quan-
tifies how “embarrassing” this estimate is if s = s0
turns out to be the case:
L (σ, s0)
The expected embarrassment can be computed by
using the knowledge p(s) about s:
〈L (σ, s0)〉p(s0) =
ˆ
ds0L (σ, s0) p(s0)
The next step is to take the estimate σ that min-
imizes the expected embarrassment; that is, the ex-
pectation value of the loss function. For different loss
functions, one arrives at different recipes for how to
extract an estimate σ from the belief p(s); for exam-
ple, for s ∈ R:
L (σ, s0) =
=

−δ(σ − s0) ⇒ Take σ such that
p(s)|s=σ is maximal
|σ − s0| ⇒ Take σ to be the median
(σ − s0)2 ⇒ Take σ to be the mean
(2)
In the context of parameter estimation, there is no
general loss function that one should take. In many
scientific applications, the third option is favored, but
different situations might enforce different loss func-
tions. In the context of probability distributions, one
3has a mathematical structure available to guide the
choice. In this context, one can restrict the possibili-
ties by requiring consistent loss functions.
III. THE UNIQUE LOSS FUNCTION
How embarrassing is it to approximate a probability
distribution by q(s) even though it is actually p(s)?
We quantify the embarrassment in a loss function
L
( q
m
, s0
)
(3)
which says how embarrassing it is to tell someone q(s)
is one’s belief about s in the event that later s is mea-
sured to be s0. Here m is introduced as reference
measure to make L coordinate independent. For a
finite set coordinate independence is trivially fulfilled
and it might seem that having a reference measure
m is superficial. Note however, that it is a sensible
additional requirement to have the quantification be
invariant under splitting of events, i.e. mapping to a
bigger set where two now distinguishable events rep-
resent one former large event. The quotient qm is in-
variant under such splitting of events, whereas q itself
is not. The reference measure m can be any measure
such that q is absolutely continuous with respect to
m.
Note further that we restrict ourselves to the case
that we get to know the exact value of s. This does
not make our approach less general; imagining that
we would instead take a more general loss L(q, q˜(s))
where q˜ is the knowledge about s at some later point,
then we may define L
(
q
m , s0
)
= L(q, δss0) with δ de-
noting the Kronecker or Dirac delta function, and thus
restrict ourselves again to the case of exact knowledge.
This line of reasoning was spelled out in detail by John
Skilling [25]:
“If there are general theories, then they
must apply to special cases”.
To decide which belief to tell someone, we look at
the expected loss〈
L
( q
m
, s0
)〉
p(s0)
=
ˆ
ds0L
( q
m
, s0
)
p(s0) (4)
and try to find a q ∈ X that minimizes this expected
loss. To sum up, if we are given a loss function, we
have a recipe for how to optimally approximate the
belief. Which loss functions are sensible, though? We
enforce two criteria that a good loss function should
satisfy.
Criterion 1 (Locality) If s = s0 turned out to be
the case, L only depends on the prediction q actually
makes about s0:
L
( q
m
, s0
)
= L
(
q(s0)
m(s0)
)
(5)
Note that we make an abuse of notation here, denot-
ing the function on both sides of the equation by the
same symbol. The criterion is called locality because
it demands that the functional of qm should be eval-
uated locally for every s0. It also forbids a direct
dependence of the loss L on s0 which excludes losses
that are a priori biased towards certain outcomes s0.
This form of locality is an intrinsically Bayesian
property. Consider a situation where one wants to
decide which of two rivaling hypotheses to believe. In
order to distinguish them, some data d are measured.
To update the prior using Bayes theorem, one only
needs to know how probable the measured data d are
given each hypothesis, not how probable other pos-
sible data d˜ 6= d that were not measured are. This
might seem intuitive, but there exist hypothesis de-
cision methods (not necessarily based on loss func-
tions) that do not fulfill this property. For example,
the non-Bayesian p-value depends mostly on data that
were not measured (all the data that are at least as
“extreme” as the measured data). Thus, it is a prop-
erty of Bayesian reasoning to judge predictions only
by using what was predicted about things that were
measured.
The second criterion is even more natural. If one is
not restricted in what can be told to others, then the
best thing should be to tell them the actual belief p.
Criterion 2 (Optimality of the actual belief, proper-
ness.) Let X be the set of all probability distributions
over s. For all p and all m, the probability distribution
q ∈ X with minimal expected loss is q = p:
0 =
(
∂
∂q(s)
〈
L
( q
m
, s0
)〉
p
)
q=p
(6)
The last criterion is also referred to as a proper
loss (score) function in the literature; see Reference
[26] for a mathematical overview of different proper
scoring rules. Our version of this property is slightly
modified to the version that is found in the literature
as we demand this optimum to be obtained indepen-
dently of a reference measure m. There is a funda-
mental Bayesian desiderata stating that “If there are
multiple ways to arrive at a solutions, then they must
agree.” We’d like to justify why this is a property
that is absolutely important. If one uses statistics
as a tool to answer some question, then if that an-
swer would depend on how statistics is applied, then
this statistic itself is inconsistent. In our case, where
the defined loss function is dependent on an arbitrary
reference measure m, the result is thus forced to be
independent of that m.
Note furthermore that although intuitively we want
the global optimum to be at the actual belief p (re-
ferred to as strictly proper in the literature), mathe-
matically we only need it to be an extreme value for
our derivation.
Having these two consistency requirements fixed, we
derive which kind of consistent loss functions are pos-
sible. We insert Equation (5) into Equation (6), ex-
pand the domain of the loss function to not necessarily
normalized positive vectors q(s) but introduce λ as a
Lagrange multiplier to account for the fact that we
minimize under the constraint of normalization. We
4compute
0 =
(
∂
∂q(s)
´
ds0
(
L
(
q(s0)
m(s0)
)
p(s0) + λ q(s0)
))
q=p
=
´
ds0 ∂L
(
p(s0)
m(s0)
)
δ(s−s0)
m(s0)
p(s0) + λ δ(s− s0)
= ∂L
(
p(s)
m(s)
)
p(s)
m(s) + λ
⇒ ∂L
(
p(s)
m(s)
)
= −λm(s)p(s)
(7)
Here ∂L denotes the derivative of L . In the next
step we substitute x := p(s)m(s) for the quotient. Note
that Equation (7) holds for all positive real values of
x ∈ R+ since the requested measure independence of
the resulting ranking permits to insert any measure
m. We then obtain
∂L (x) = −λx⇒ L (x) = −C ln (x) +D (8)
where C > 0 and D are constants with respect to q.
Note that through the two consistency requirements
one is able to completely fix what the loss function is.
In the original proof of [14], there arises an additional
possibility for L if the sample space consists of 2 el-
ements. In that case, the locality axiom, as it is used
in the literature, does not constrain L at all. In our
case, where we introduced m as a reference measure,
we are able to exclude that possibility. Note that the
constants C and D are irrelevant for determining the
optimal approximation as they do not affect where the
minimum of the loss function is.
To sum up our result if one is restricted to the closed
set X of probability distributions, one should take
that q ∈ X that minimizes〈
L
( q
m
, s0
)〉
p(s0)
= −
ˆ
ds0 p(s0) ln
(
q(s0)
m(s0)
)
(9)
in order to obtain the optimal approximation, where
it is not important what m is used.
If one takes m = 1, this loss is the cross entropy
〈−ln (q(s0))〉p(s0) .
If one desires a rating of how good an approxima-
tion is, and not only a ranking which approximation
is best, one could go one step further and enforce a
third criterion:
Criterion 3 (zero loss of the actual belief) For all p,
the expected loss of the probability distribution p is 0:
0 =
〈
L
( p
m
, s0
)〉
p
(10)
This criterion trivially forces m = p and makes the
quantification unique while inducing the same rank-
ing. Thus we arrive at the Kullback-Leibler divergence
KL(p, q) =
ˆ
ds0 p(s0)ln
(
p(s0)
q(s0)
)
as the optimal rating and ranking function.
To phrase the result in words, the optimal way to
approximate the belief p is such that given the approx-
imated belief q, the amount of information KL(p, q)
that has to be obtained for someone who believes q
to arrive back at the actual belief p is minimal. We
should make it as easy as possible for someone who
got an approximation q to get to the correct belief p.
This sounds like a trivial statement, explaining why
the approximation KL is already widely used for ex-
actly that task.
IV. DISCUSSION
We briefly discuss the implications of these results.
In comparison to Reference [2, 4], we presented an-
other more elementary line of argumentation for the
claim that the approximation KL is the correct rank-
ing function for approximating which holds in a more
general setting.
Other works that base their results on minimizing
the inference KL (KL(q, p)) for belief approximation
are not optimal with respect to the ranking function
we derived in Section III. One reason for preferring the
for this purpose non-optimal inference KL is that it
is computationally feasible for many applications, in
contrast to the optimal approximation. As long as the
optimal scheme is not computationally accessible, this
argument has its merits.
Another reason for minimizing the inference KL for
approximation that is often cited (e.g., [27]) is that it
gives a lower bound to the log-likelihood
ln(p(d|s)) =
〈
ln
(
p(d, s)
q(s)
)〉
q(s)
+ KL(q, p) (11)
which for example gives rise to the expectation maxi-
mization (EM- ) algorithm [28]. However, the method
only gives rise to maximum a posteriori or maximum
likelihood solutions, which corresponds to optimizing
the δ-loss of Equation (2).
In Reference [11], it is claimed that minimizing the
inference KL yields more desirable results since for
multi-modal distributions, individual modes can be
fitted with a mono-modal distribution such as a Gaus-
sian distribution, whereas the resulting distribution
has a very large variance when minimizing the ap-
proximation KL to account for all modes. In Figure 1
there is an example of this behavior. The true distri-
bution of the quantity s is taken to be a mixture of
two standard Gaussians with means ±3. It is approx-
imated with one Gaussian distribution by using the
approximation KL and the inference KL. When using
the approximation KL, the resulting distribution has
a large variance to cover both peaks. Minimizing the
inference KL leads to a sharply peaked approxima-
tion around one peak. A user of this method might
be very confident that the value of s must be near
3, even though the result is heavily dependent on the
initial condition of the minimization and could have
become peaked around −3 just as well.
We find that fitting a multi-modal distribution with
a mono-modal one will yield suboptimal results ir-
respective of the fitting scheme. An approximation
should always have the goal to be close to the target
that is being approximated. If it is already apparent
that this goal cannot be achieved, it is recommended
5to rethink the set of approximative distributions and
not dwell on the algorithm used for approximation.
In Reference [12] an approximative simulation
scheme called information field dynamics is described.
There, a Gaussian distribution q is matched to a
time-evolved version U(p) of a Gaussian distribution
p. This matching is done by minimizing the infer-
ence KL. In this particular case (at least for infor-
mation preserving dynamics), the matching can be
made optimal without making the algorithm more
complicated. Since for information preserving dy-
namics time evolution is just a change of coordinates
and the Kullback–Leibler divergence is invariant un-
der such transformations, one can instead match the
Gaussian distribution p and U−1(q) by minimizing
KL(p, U−1(q)) = KL(U(p), q), which is just as diffi-
cult in terms of computation.
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Figure 1: Results of approximating a target
distribution in s with a Gaussian distribution. KL:
Kullback–Leibler.
In Reference [13] it is claimed that the inference KL
yields an optimal approximation scheme fulfilling cer-
tain axioms. This result is the exact opposite of our
result. This disagreement is due to an assumed con-
sistency of approximations. In Reference [13], further
approximations are forced to be consistent with earlier
approximations; i.e., if one does two approximations,
one gets the same result as with one joint approxima-
tion. Due to this requirement, the derived functional
cannot satisfy some of the axioms that we used. In
our picture, it is better to do one large approxima-
tion instead of many small approximations. This is in
accordance to the behavior of other approximations.
For example, when step-wise rounding the real num-
ber 1.49, one gets 2 if it is first rounded to one deci-
mal and then to integer precision compared to being
rounded to integer precision directly where one gets
1. If information is lost due to approximation, it is
natural for further approximations to be less precise
than if one were to approximate in one go.
There also exist cases where we could not find
any comments explaining why the arguments of the
Kullback–Leibler divergence are in that particular or-
der. In general, it would be desirable that authors
provide a short argumentation for why they choose
a particular order of the arguments of the KL diver-
gence.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Using the two elementary consistency requirements
on locality and optimality, as expressed by Equations
(5) and (6), respectively, we have shown that there
is only one ranking function that ranks how good
an approximation of a belief is, analogously to Ref-
erence [14]. By minimizing KL(p, q) with respect to
its second argument q ∈ X, one gets the best approx-
imation to p. This is claimed at several points in the
literature. Nevertheless, we found sources where other
functionals were minimized in order to obtain an ap-
proximation. This confusion is probably due to the
fact that for the slightly different task of updating a
belief q under new constraints, KL(p, q) has to be min-
imized with respect to p, its first argument [29, 30].
We do not claim that any of the direction of Kullback–
Leibler divergence are wrong by themselves, but one
should be careful of when to use which.
We hope that for the case of approximating a prob-
ability distribution p by another q we have given con-
vincing and conclusive arguments for why this should
be done by minimizing KL(p, q) with respect to q, if
this is feasible.
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